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Abstract: A recent argument against content internalism bucks tradition: it
abandons Twin-Earth-style thought experiments and instead claims that internalism
is inconsistent with plausible principles relating belief contents and truth values.
Call this (for reasons that will become obvious) the transparency argument. Here, it
is shown that there is a structurally parallel argument against content internalism’s
foil: content externalism. Preserving the transparency argument while fending off
the parallel argument against externalism requires that (1) content-determination
and truth-value-determination are implausibly linked together and that (2)
eternalism about belief contents is true. Given these requirements, there may be
reason to prefer simple, thought-experiment-based arguments against
internalism––the sort of arguments that the transparency argument is meant to
supersede.
1. Introduction
Content internalism––roughly, the thesis that mental content is fully determined by
intrinsic features of a thinking subject––is often believed to fall at the hands of
Twin-Earth-style thought experiments. A recent argument against internalism (due
to Yli-Vakkuri 2018) abandons these thought experiments. The argument, at a
certain level of abstraction, is this: given plausible assumptions, internalism implies
that a belief and its content can differ in truth value. But this is absurd: a belief and
its content cannot differ in truth value.1 Thus, internalism is false. Call this the
transparency argument. If successful, it would mark welcome progress in a
decades-old debate. So, is it successful?
Some think not, arguing that (among other things) the internalist may deny one or
more of the transparency argument’s premisses (Sawyer 2018; Rieppel 2019;
Woodling 2019). Perhaps this is so––I am sympathetic to extant criticisms.
However, I want to raise a separate issue. On the one hand, the transparency
argument is meant to appeal to the externalist––someone who thinks that mental
content is determined in part by extrinsic features of a thinking subject. On the other
hand, the transparency argument suggests an exactly parallel argument against
externalism itself. That is, the externalist is also apparently committed to the
absurdity that a belief and its content can differ in truth value––and for roughly the
same reasons that the internalist is.
If the externalist wishes to retain the transparency argument against internalism
and reject the parallel argument against her own view, her options are limited. And,
as far as I can tell, she will need to hold that content-determination and
truth-value-determination coincide in unexpected ways. Moreover, she will likely
have to claim that eternalism is true of belief contents––belief contents are never (in
a sense to be made precise) temporally neutral. For some, the cost of these
commitments may be worth the benefit of the transparency argument against
1 The transparency argument is also supposed to target the contents of utterances in natural
language. I do not address this here since it might be complicated by potential dissimilarities
between belief content and linguistic meaning (Pietroski 2020).
internalism. For others, they will be reason to avoid the argument and retreat to the
thought experiments that gave rise to externalism in the first place.
2. The Argument Against Internalism
Consider my token belief that tomatoes are red. Most think that the content of this
belief is (something like) the proposition that tomatoes are red. What makes it the
case that my belief has this content as opposed to some other content or no content
at all? If answerable, there are exactly two possibilities. Either my belief’s content is
fully determined by the way that I am intrinsically or it is not. And if it is not, then it
must instead be determined at least in part by my non-intrinsic features (plausibly, in
conjunction with my intrinsic features).
The first sort of answer belongs to the internalist. She holds that my belief has
the content it does purely because of how I am intrinsically. To illustrate, imagine an
intrinsic duplicate of me called ‘Dup’. If Dup is indeed my intrinsic duplicate, then
each part of Dup must correspond to a part of me. If I have a head, Dup has a
corresponding head. If I have a hand, Dup has a corresponding hand. Similarly,
since beliefs are parts of my mental economy, if I have a belief, Dup has a
corresponding belief. The internalist holds that if the content of my belief is that
tomatoes are red, then the content of Dup’s corresponding belief must also be that
tomatoes are red (and vice versa). In fact, if we are intrinsic duplicates, and if belief
contents are fully determined by intrinsic features of believers, all of our
corresponding beliefs must share their contents. In other words, for each token
belief, internalism identifies some feature of the belief that would survive intrinsic
duplication of this sort and then claims that it is this feature that determines the
belief’s content. Call any such feature an internal content-determining feature––or
just I-feature for short.
Tradition has it that internalism falls at the hands of certain thought experiments
(I will review one of them shortly). But Yli-Vakkuri (2018) claims to have found a
thought-experiment-free argument against internalism. He begins by identifying a
consequence of, or else a claim closely associated with, internalism:
NARROWC: □∀x∀y(Ixy → c(x) = c(y))2
The domain of quantification here is restricted to beliefs; ‘Ixy’ means that x
corresponds to y in that they possess the same I-feature; and the function ‘c(x)’ picks
out the truth-evaluable content of x. Accordingly, we read NARROWC as saying that,
necessarily, beliefs with the same I-feature have the same content.
According to Yli-Vakkuri, the falsity of NARROWC follows from just two
principles: (1) a belief’s truth value is the truth value of its content and (2)
corresponding beliefs of intrinsic duplicates may differ in truth value. Letting the
function ‘v(x)’ pick out the truth value of x, we formalize each as follows:
TRANSPARENCY: □∀x v(x) = v(c(x))
I-DIFFERENCE: ¬□∀x∀y(Ixy → v(x) = v(y))3
3 This is the principle others have called ‘BROADT’. Rieppel (2019: 471-3) offers an
interesting discussion of Yli-Vakkuri’s (2018) defence of this principle.
2 We may, as Yli-Vakkuri (2018) does, remain neutral on the species of objective necessity
invoked here––i.e. whether it is nomological, metaphysical, or something else.
TRANSPARENCY says that, necessarily, a belief’s truth value is identical with the truth
value of its content. This seems sufficiently obvious. But I-DIFFERENCE says that it is
not necessary that beliefs with the same I-feature have the same truth value, and this
is not immediately obvious. Yli-Vakkuri defends this by claiming that “truth is a
paradigmatic broad semantic property” (2018: 83-84). A belief’s truth depends (or
can depend) on the way the external world is. From this, he infers that beliefs with
the same I-feature may differ in truth value.
The problem is that NARROWC, TRANSPARENCY, and I-DIFFERENCE are inconsistent
in modal logics as weak as K. Yli-Vakkuri (2018: 86, fn. 10) offers a formal proof,
but the intuitive idea is simple enough. Suppose a belief’s I-feature is sufficient to
determine its content (by NARROWC) but that its I-feature is not sufficient to
determine its truth value (by I-DIFFERENCE). It follows from these two claims that it
is possible that beliefs with the same content differ in truth value. But this is
impossible––a belief’s truth value is the truth value of its content (by
TRANSPARENCY), and so beliefs with the same content must have the same truth value.
Hence, if TRANSPARENCY and I-DIFFERENCE are true, then NARROWC is false. And since
NARROWC is a consequence of internalism, internalism is false. This is the
transparency argument against internalism.
3. A Transparency Argument Against Externalism
The source of the problem for internalism seems clear: if a belief’s I-feature is
sufficient to determine its content but not its truth value, then it is possible that
beliefs with the same content differ in truth value. Interestingly, a structurally
analogous argument also applies to externalism.
Why has the analogous argument gone unnoticed? I suspect it is because, for the
purposes of the present debate, many have understood externalism as the mere
denial of NARROWC. But fleshed out varieties of externalism must do more than issue
a negative claim to the effect that NARROWC is false. Instead, they must offer a
positive claim about how the contents of belief are determined. In broad outline,
externalists are united by the idea that belief contents are determined by subjects’
intrinsic features in conjunction with their extrinsic features. To illustrate, consider
the Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam 1975). It is intuitive that my beliefs
about what I call ‘water’ are beliefs about the chemical substance H2O. But my
duplicate’s beliefs on a distant, H2O-less planet––beliefs about what he calls
‘water’––are about the chemical substance XYZ. Although we are intrinsically the
same, our beliefs differ in content. Intuitively, the difference in content is due to
differences in our respective environments––or, more precisely, our being related to
distinct environments makes for differences in belief content. This is the core insight
of externalism: extrinsic features of subjects determine that their beliefs have the
contents that they do (again, in conjunction with certain intrinsic features of
subjects). Call any feature that is at least partially extrinsic to a subject and that fully
determines the content of her belief an external content-determining feature––or just
E-feature for short. It is this sort of feature, whatever it may be, that determines the
content of a belief––at least if externalism is true.
As with internalism, there is a principle either entailed by or closely associated
with externalism:
BROADC: □∀x∀y(Exy → c(x) = c(y))
As before, the domain of quantification is restricted to beliefs, and the two-place
predicate ‘Exy’ means that x and y have the same E-feature. The principle thus
reads: necessarily, if two beliefs have the same E-feature, then they have the same
content. For example, even though my twin on Twin Earth has different belief
contents than I do, had our environments both contained H2O and not XYZ, our
“water-related” belief contents would have been the same (ignoring, for the moment,
indexical contents). Our intrinsically identical internal constitutions conjoined with
the fact that we are related to type-identical environments would ensure this.
In short, we have a pair of parallel modal principles: NARROWC and BROADC. The
former is closely associated with internalism and the latter with externalism. They
differ only in that one principle appeals to I-features and the other appeals to
E-features.
BROADC is threatened by an argument that parallels the argument against
NARROWC. The argument begins with a relatively simple thought:
content-determination and truth-determination are two distinct, and presumably
independent, things. Whatever extrinsic features are sufficient for determining the
content of a belief, those same features are not always, or even typically, sufficient
for determining the belief’s truth value. This intuitive idea is reflected in the history
of psychosemantics: despite a wide variety of theories, no one (to my knowledge)
has advocated a theory where content- and truth-determination necessarily coincide.
Consider, for the sake of illustration, a simple tracking account on which a belief’s
content is determined by the proposition whose truth it tracks under optimal
conditions (Stalnaker 1984: 17-19). And suppose for concreteness that I believe that
there is a rabbit in the woods. On a tracking account, my belief tracks the truth of
the proposition that there is a rabbit in the woods. That is, when I have the belief
under optimal conditions, it is true that there is a rabbit in the woods, and so my
belief is true. But another situation is also possible: I fail to be in optimal conditions,
and my belief is false. Unbeknownst to me, all trees have been burned to the ground
and rabbits have gone extinct. So, my beliefs in each scenario, though they track the
same proposition, do not have the same truth value.
The idea generalizes. Content-determination and truth-determination are
independent affairs. So, even if a partly extrinsic property determines belief content,
it is nonetheless possible for a belief to have that extrinsic property in situations
where it is true and situations where it is false. Or, slightly more accurately, for any
property that is a plausible candidate for an E-feature, it is possible that beliefs x and
y possess that E-feature and yet differ in truth value.
E-DIFFERENCE: ¬□∀x∀y(Exy → v(x) = v(y))
We are now in a familiar situation. For the same reason that NARROWC, I-DIFFERENCE,
and TRANSPARENCY are inconsistent, BROADC, E-DIFFERENCE, and TRANSPARENCY are
also inconsistent. And if we grant E-DIFFERENCE and TRANSPARENCY, then we must
reject BROADC, and with it externalism.
Now, Yli-Vakkuri points out that the transparency argument against internalism
is “not, of course, psychologically impossible to resist––no philosophical argument
is. A sufficiently dedicated internalist will find a way to resist it” (2018: 86-87).
Likewise, the parallel argument against externalism can be resisted by a sufficiently
dedicated externalist. What strategies might she employ? That depends. If she
wishes to retain the transparency argument against internalism, her options are few.
To begin, two options will not do. First, the externalist cannot deny
TRANSPARENCY, for then she loses the transparency argument against
internalism––which I am assuming she wishes to retain. Second, the externalist
should not deny BROADC. For if she denies that her view has the modal consequences
codified by BROADC, then the internalist may reasonably deny that her view has the
modal consequences codified by NARROWC. For example, the externalist could hold
that belief content is grounded in, but not necessitated by E-features (see Schaffer
2010 for a discussion of grounding and necessitation). But if she does this, the
internalist could make a parallel move and say that belief content is grounded in, but
not necessitated by I-features.
The only plausible option is for the externalist to find some way of resisting
E-DIFFERENCE. Now, E-DIFFERENCE is prima facie plausible. As I have suggested,
content-determination and truth-determination are independent affairs. That is, the
properties of a belief that determine its content are distinct from the properties that
determine its truth value. A belief is true in virtue of the fact that its content is true.
But it does not have its content in virtue of the fact that its content is true. Denying
E-DIFFERENCE does not sit comfortably with this. Its denial is equivalent to the claim
that, necessarily, beliefs with the same E-feature have the same truth value (at a
world). There is thus a necessary connection between content-determination and
truth-value. But given that a belief’s content and its truth value have different
determinants, this necessary connection is prima facie puzzling, and perhaps even
undesirable.
Moreover, even if there is a way to render this commitment less puzzling, there
is a further commitment that one must take on in denying E-DIFFERENCE.
Specifically, denying E-DIFFERENCE requires eternalism about belief contents––i.e.
the position that a belief’s content cannot change truth value over time at a world.
The reason is that if eternalism is false, a case that supports E-DIFFERENCE is
relatively easy to construct. To illustrate, we can consider a single, token belief
evaluated at two different times relative to a world w. For concreteness, assume the
belief has the temporally neutral content there is sriracha in the fridge and that this
content is determined by some E-feature of the belief. In w, sometimes there is
sriracha in the fridge and sometimes there is not. The content of the belief, and thus
the belief itself, varies in truth value at w depending on the time of evaluation. So its
truth value changes but its E-feature does not. Hence, beliefs with the same
E-feature need not have the same truth-value––that is, E-DIFFERENCE is true. To deny
E-DIFFERENCE, there can be no case like this whatsoever––cases of this sort must be
impossible. And this seems to require that no contents are temporally neutral and,
accordingly, eternalism.
Of course, eternalism is not problematic in itself. There is precedent for various
forms of the view (e.g. Moore 1962, Richard 1981, and Salmon 1986). Equally,
however, there is precedent for the denial of eternalism or temporalism (e.g. Prior
1959, Kaplan 1989, and Brogaard 2013).4 Some externalists will not mind
committing to eternalism. But those who accept temporalism will need a different
strategy. And those who, like myself, find the eternalist v. temporalist debate
frustratingly subtle should be wary. For it is plausible that “coverage of the data will
be exactly the same for each [view]” (Dever 2015: 2), making the choice between
eternalism and temporalism especially difficult.5
The overall point, then, is that if the externalist tries to retain the transparency
argument against internalism while rejecting a parallel argument against
externalism, then she must (1) reject E-DIFFERENCE and plausibly (2) accept
eternalism about belief contents. This seems risky. Denying E-DIFFERENCE
implausibly links together content-determination and truth-value. And eternalism,
though not itself implausible, is a substantial commitment to make in arguing for
content externalism. Thankfully, the transparency argument is not mandatory. There
are other, more stable arguments for externalism––albeit ones that still rely on
thought experiments.6
Jonathan Brink Morgan
Montclair State University, USA
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6 Many thanks to two anonymous referees for generous feedback that improved this paper
significantly. Thanks also to Chelsey Deisher for reading multiple drafts.
5 The issue concerning eternalism also raises questions about whether truth is fundamentally
monadic or relational. See Cappellen and Hawthorne 2009 and MacFarlane 2014.
4 To be clear, this debate is typically framed as a debate about contents in general and not
just about the contents of belief.
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